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Late in July of this year, a story appeared in Montana news
papers which observed the appointment of a number of out
standing businessmen to the Board of Directors of a major fi
nancial institution. We were pleased to note that Charles B.
Anderson, in the brief biographical sketch allowed him, listed
his position as chairman of the Advisory Council of the School
of Business Administration, which he apparently felt was as
important as his membership in Phi Beta Kappa, past presi
dencies of the Great Falls Chamber of Commerce and Rotary
Club, and directorship of the Central Bank of Montana.
A few days later, another paper headlined the selection of
John Toole of Missoula as director of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis. Again, in the few lines of biographical data
there was included his association with the advisory council
(he was last year’s chairman).1
It goes without saying that we in turn are proud to have men
like Charles Anderson and John Toole, and the twenty others
who serve with them, lend advice and counsel to the school’s
administration in the development of our plans and the realiz
ing of our goals. We hope that the others, too, feel that service
on the Advisory Council is a matter of pride and satisfaction.
It may be that not everyone is acquainted with the role of the
Advisory Council members. The council was intended to be
more than a rubber-stamp committee. While it does not actually
determine any policies, the council does shape them through
discussions in which individual members freely take positions
ranging from “devil’s advocate” to defense of the status quo.
Their comments reflect their experience and their close touch
’Mr. Toole w ill fill the vacancy on the board created by the elevation
of former director Hugh D. Galusha to the presidency of the bank.
Mr. Galusha until recently also served on the advisory council of the
School of Business Administration, including one year as chairman.
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with Montana’s business and economic problems; they are most
valuable in keeping us informed on business as it is and as it
ought to be.
With rare insight and frankness the council has debated in
recent meetings such topics as the evolving business school
curriculum, faculty recruiting, what services the business com
munity can render to the University of Montana, the encour
agement and financing of research, the promotion of adult edu
cation, and the raising of scholarship money. The council, by
its enthusiasm, was directly responsible for our present Quar
terly. It strongly urged a change from the monthly Montana
Business Review and made numerous suggestions that have
guided our development.
We have felt for some time that many more people should
know of the Advisory Council and its members. Therefore, we
are happy to introduce to you the present members. They are
men whose sense of public responsibility has led them to give
valuable time and energies to the School and the Bureau of
Business and Economic Research. In introducing them we also
wish to acknowledge our gratitude.

Associate Director
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The Uniform Commercial Code
Updates Montana Sales Law
GEORGE MITCHELL
Assistant Professor
School of Business Administration
University of Montana, Missoula

History of the U.C.C.
In 1963 the Uniform Commercial Code (let’s call it the U.C.C.
for short) was enacted by the Thirty-Eighth Legislative As
sembly1 and became effective in this state on January 1, 1965.
Any businessman in Montana who has not apprised himself of
the changes wrought by the enactment of the U.C.C. may be in
for a lot of surprises. Here are a few samples of the pitfalls
he will need to know about—many contracts once required to
be in writing are now enforceable though only oral; one may
now be bound by a contract which he did not sign and which
contains terms different from or in addition to those which he
offered, even though a term such as the price, which was prev
iously essential to its enforcement, is omitted; and in 1965 the
old rule that “an offer may be revoked any time before accept
ance” no longer applies to written offers signed by merchants.
Under the new U.C.C. rules, shipment of goods to the buyer
may constitute an acceptance of the buyer’s offer even though
the goods do not conform to the terms of the offer; and con
tracts required by the statute of frauds to be in writing are no
longer totally enforceable, though oral, when they have been
partially performed. Any one of these sudden changes could
bring the uninformed businessman face-to-face with the legal
maxim which often proves the most costly to learn—that “ignorance of the law is no excuse.”
The law is a living thing. It must grow and change to meet
'Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Chapter 264, Laws of 1963.
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the needs of the society which it serves. If a law once passed
were unchangeable, it could stifle the development of that very
segment of society which it was enacted to serve. It was a rec
ognition of the need for change in the law pertaining to com
mercial transactions which led to the Uniform Commercial
Code. The changes in modern business due to technological ad
vancement, experience, and the increased sophistication of the
members of the business community made it imperative that
the law be changed to keep abreast of new developments. The
Uniform Commercial Code itself, in Section 87A-1-102, as
adopted by Montana, states that its “underlying purposes and
policies” are:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing com
mercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial prac
tices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.

The first effort on a national scale to accomplish these pur
poses began over twenty years ago. Initially the idea was to
revise and update the many uniform acts which dealt with the
various facets of commercial law; but at an annual meeting of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1940, it was proposed that one uniform code treating
all aspects of commercial law be drafted. Y7ork on the Article
on Sales began in 1942, and in 1945, an Editorial Board com
posed of representatives of the National Conference of Com
missioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law In
stitute started work on the entire project. With the aid of
hundreds of judges, lawyers, educators, and businessmen from
all oyer the country, and a grant of over $275,000 from the
Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation, the first completed U.C.C.
was issued in the fall of 1951. But only the state of Pennsyl
vania, in 1953, enacted this nationally conceived U.C.C. After
extensive study and revision by the New York Law Revision
Commission and the Editorial Board, and the issuance of a
revised U.C.C. late in 1956, two more states (Massachusetts in
September of 1957 and Kentucky in 1958) enacted the U.C.C.
Further revisions were made and the U.C.C. was republished
as the “1958 Official Text,” which was then adopted by fifteen
more states. However, the fact that nearly all of these states
made their own modifications to the Official Text impaired
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uniformity among the several states, and led to the grant of
another $125,000 by the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation
to endow a permanent Editorial Board to review and approve
suggested changes in the Official Text. Due to the efforts of
this permanent Editorial Board a new “1962 Official Text” was
issued; it is substantially the U.C.C. adopted by the ThirtyEighth Legislative Assembly of Montana in 1963.
By September of this year, when the U.C.C. is to become
effective in Nebraska, the U.C.C. will be effective in 29 states.
By the end of the year 1965 it is anticipated that many more
states will adopt similar codes. The only states which have
neither passed the U.C.C. nor had such bills introduced this
year are South Dakota, Vermont, Idaho, Louisiana, Arizona,
and Mississippi.
The scope of the U.C.C. as adopted by Montana may best be
understood by observing that it contains ten separate chapters.
Their subjects include Sales, Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits
and Collections, Letters of Credit, Bank Transfers, Documents
of Title, Investment Securities, and Secured Transactions. The
U.C.C. achieves a new dimension in bringing together areas of
commercial law which had been separately treated. The sub
jects of more than a half dozen previously separate uniform
acts and innumerable individual statutes have been superceded
by the new collective U.C.C. The framers achieved a new con
tinuity and interrelation of the various aspects of the law re
lating to commercial transactions and eliminated many incon
sistencies resulting from piecemeal enactment and amendment.
The resulting comprehensive coverage is an improvement both
because it makes for uniformity among the states, and because
the bulk of commercial law may now be found in a single
source in any state which has adopted the U.C.C.
Before the enactment of the U.C.C. in Montana, for example,
it was usually necessary to examine several sources in order
to determine what the law was with regard to any given trans
action. More time and more money had to be spent to find an
answer even when one employed an attorney. In addition, fre
quently no reliable conclusion could be drawn because the
sources were often ambiguous or inconsistent. Montana com
mercial law simply had not been as highly developed by the
courts of this state as it has been by the courts of the more
populous and industrialized states. Many commercial law ques
tions had never been answered by the Montana courts, and in
the absence of an applicable statute could only be answered if

12
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at all, by reference to the opinions of courts of other states.
Even if a case in another state could be found which answered
the same question which had been raised in Montana, there
was no certainty that the courts of this state would reach the
same conclusion. Under the U.C.C., however, the extensive ex
perience of other states and the best of all the opinions of all
of the courts have been codified into this one Uniform Com
mercial Code. The adoption of this U.C.C. thus brings Montana
up to date with the best commercial law of other states and
makes further economic development possibilities more legally
inviting.

The Scope of the Chapter on Sales
Because of the wide scope of the U.C.C. a detailed discus
sion of all of its articles and provisions is impossible in an
article of this nature; such an undertaking would require sev
eral volumes. This discussion, therefore, is confined to Chap
ter 2 on “Sales” and does not deal with the changes made by
that Chapter in the law of warranties or the remedies avail
able to buyer and seller, which will be treated by a subsequent
article. The discussion herein concentrates on those sections
which inaugurate the greatest changes in the laws which affect
Montana businessmen.
The first problem presented by Chapter 2 is to determine
which transactions fall within its provisions, for if the trans
action does not fall within Chapter 2 its provisions do not
apply. Chapter 2 is limited in its application to “transactions in
goods”2 which was intended to mean tangible goods moveable
at the time of their identification to the contract.3 The chapter
includes contracts involving timber, minerals, or structures if
they are to be severed by the seller ,4 and contracts involving
crops or other things attached to the realty which are capable
of severance without material harm “regardless of who is to
effect the severance.”5
Contracts which are specifically precluded from the purview
of Chapter 2 by the U.C.C. are those involving secured transac2Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-2-102.
3Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-2-105.
‘Ibid., Section 87A-2-107 (1).
5Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 Official Text, Section 2-107, Com
ment 2.
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tions such as chattel mortgages or conditional sales contracts0
which are covered by Chapter 9; those involving investment se
curities7* which are covered by Chapter 8 ; and those involving
things in action, such as the assignment of a contract right or
a tort claim for a consideration. Thus Chapter 2 applies only
to sales of movable goods as opposed to services, real property,
or intangible things in action, and is further limited to sales of
goods which do not involve a security agreement. To the extent
that Chapter 2 or any other Chapter of the U.C.C. applies to a
contract the prior law is superceded,8 but as to those contracts
or those matters within a contract for which the U.C.C. makes
no provision, the prior law remains unchanged and applicable.
Higher Standards Imposed on Merchants

The U.C.C. introduces a novel concept into commercial law
by applying different rules to merchants than to nonmerchants
in fifteen of the Sections in Chapter 2. A person may be a
“merchant” in one transaction but not another. A merchant is
defined as one who is a dealer in the goods, or who holds him
self out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods or
practices involved, or who employs an agent or broker whom
he holds out as having such knowledge or skill.9 For example,
a person who owns a hardware store is a merchant as to sales
of hardware in the ordinary course of his business, but not as
to the sale of his personal car or his used delivery truck.
In most instances these sections impose a higher standard
on merchants regardless of whether they are dealing with one
another or with a nonmerchant. This reflects a trend away
from prior legal concepts which treated the merchant and non
merchant equally. It has long been felt that the merchant’s
knowledge of commerce, and the fact that the merchants gen
erally set the mercantile standards, meant that to treat them
equally with nonmerchants was to place the merchants in a
favored position. The old Common L aw .concept of “caveat
emptor” or “let the buyer beware” has been recognized as un
workable in a modern business context for some time. Inroads
on the stronger position of the merchant seller were made
through the imposition of implied warranties and by judicial
rules of contract construction—such as that rule which requires
that a contract be construed most strongly against the party who
1962 Official Text, Section 2-102, Comment 1.
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-2-105 (1).
hJbid., Section 87A-1-103.
“Ibid., Section 87A-2-104.
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drafted it, which of course is generally the merchant. But under
the U.C.C., for the first time, merchants are separately classified
and specifically subjected to a different set of rules than the
nonmerchants. For example, unless a contract requires ship
ment by carrier or delivery by a bailee without movement of
the goods, the risk of loss passes to the buyer on tender of de
livery of the goods if the seller is a nonmerchant. If, however,
the seller is a merchant, the risk of loss does not pass to the
buyer until he has actually received the goods.10
Another example of the new U.C.C. law is the section which
prevents a merchant from revoking a written offer for the time
stated therein or a reasonable time if there is no time stated .11
Nonmerchants may still revoke an offer any time before it is
accepted unless some consideration has been paid to keep it
open. Also, in the case of nonmerchants, merely sending a letter
confirming a prior oral agreement does not satisfy the Statute
of Frauds which requires a sufficient writing signed by the
party sought to be charged. But if the oral contract is between
merchants, the Statute of Frauds is satisfied by a confirmatory
letter from one to the other, though not signed by the recipient,
unless the recipient objects in writing within ten days.12
Moreover, a seller who is a merchant impliedly warrants that
goods of the kind in which he regularly deals shall be free of
third-party claims of infringement13 and that they are mer
chantable ,14 whereas a nonmerchant seller is not charged with
such warranties.
The dual standard goes further in that terms in an accept
ance which once would have terminated the offer because they
were in addition to or different from the terms of the offer no
longer terminate the offer and may actually become a part of
the contract if it is between merchants .15 This dual standard
may also change the very nature of a transaction from that in
tended by the parties if a “merchant” is involved. For example,
a seller who delivers “on consignment” in order to retain title
to the goods and thus protect them from the creditors of the
party to whom they are delivered may find that such a deliv10Ibid., Section 87A-2-509 (3).

“ibid., Section
“ibid., Section
“ibid., Section
“ibid., Section
“Subsequently
Forms.

87A-2-205.
87A-2-201 (2).
87A-2-312 (3).
87A-2-314 (1).
discussed wider heading “The Battle of the Conflicting
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ery to a merchant who deals in such goods may be deemed a
“sale or return” which would transfer title to the merchant
and give his general creditors rights in the goods superior to
those of the seller, unless certain precautions were taken .10 In
addition, the dual standard imposes on a merchant buyer the
duty of following any reasonable instructions with respect to
the return of rejected goods if they are in his possession and
the seller has no agent or place of business at the market of
rejection17 or if the sale was “on approval.”18 Nor may a mercant who has rejected goods rely upon any unstated defect to
justify his rejection if the seller requested in writing a state
ment of all defects.19 If the merchant fails to list the defect upon
which he intended to rely, he may not use such defect as justi
fication for his rejection or to show any breach on the part of
the seller.
The recognition of the merchant’s greater knowledge of busi
ness matters is more particularly seen in the section of the
U.C.C. which states that any clause in a contract requiring a
signed writing to modify that written agreement must be sep
arately signed by any nonmerchant who is dealing with a mer
chant.29 Such a clause limits the right of modification, by means
other than a signed writing, between merchants whether it is
separately signed by the merchant or not. Merchants are pre
sumed to be aware of such clauses and their effect, but the sep
arate signature of the nonmerchant is required as evidence of
his actual awareness.
The above examples indicate how the dual standard imposed
by the Code may result in a higher standard being imposed on
merchants, but not all of the sections employing such a dual
standard have this result. In certain instances the dual standard
operates to the advantage of the merchant. For example, a
merchant buyer who sells rejected goods on behalf of the seller
is entitled to a commission and reimbursement of expenses
out of the proceeds.21
Whether the position of any Montana businessman with re
spect to any given transaction will be enhanced or whether he
will have a higher standard imposed upon him by these Sec10Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-2-326 (3).
17Ibid., Section 87A-2-603 (1).
1Hlbid., Section 87A-2-327 (1).
10Ibid., Section 87A-2-605 (1).
“Ibid., Section 87A-2-209 (2).
sxIbid., Section 87A-2-603 (2).
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tions of Chapter 2 which embody the new dual standard can
only be determined by a careful analysis of the facts of said
transaction and the sections applicable thereto. However, even
the cursory treatment given the examples above indicates the
importance of being aware of the existence of such a dual stan
dard. The outcome of a whole series of transactions may hinge
upon a determination of whether one or more of the parties
thereto is a “merchant.”

Changes in the Formation of a Contract
The Statute of Frauds, which requires certain agreements
to be reduced to a writing of a certain content, has existed in
all states in one form or another since the colonization of this
country. The U.C.C. does not do away with the Statute of
Frauds, but materially changes it in several important respects.
It has changed the circumstances under which a writing is
necessary, and the type of writing required, as well as the
exceptions to that requirement. Prior to the U.C.C. the Mon
tana Statute of Frauds22 required all agreements to buy or sell
personal property, including things in action, for a price of
$200 or more to be in writing and subscribed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought. In the absence of such a
writing the contract was unenforceable. The writing had to
contain all of the material elements of the agreement, though
they could be generally stated .23 Such a writing or memoran
dum had to be so drafted as to permit the court to ascertain
the essentials of the contract without resort to evidence other
than the writing itself. If, for example, the price were omitted,
the contract would be unenforceable. Under the U.C.C. Statute
of Frauds 24 only agreements involving a price of $500 or more
need be written. Agreements involving a sale of investment
securities rather than a sale of goods are specially treated by a
different section which requires contracts involving a sale of
securities to be in writing regardless of the dollar amount of the
contract.25 In addition, the formal requirements as to the con
tent of the writing itself have been substantially liberalized by
the U.C.C. Under the new code the writing need not contain all*2
“Ibid., Section 74-201.
*Lewis v . Aronow, 77 Montana 348, 355, 251 Pac. 146, (1926).
2‘Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-2-201.
*Ibid., Section 87A-8-319.
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of the material terms of the contract; instead it need only show
that a contract was signed by the party sought to be charged,
and specify the quantity .20 The required statement of the quan
tity need not be accurate, but any recovery will be limited to
the amount which is actually stated. Thus, under the U.C.C., a
contract need not indicate which party is the seller or buyer,
the price, the precise quantity, the time or place of delivery,
the quality of the goods, or any particular warranties .27 Per
haps the most important of these changes is the removal of the
requirement that price be stated in an executory contract, that
is, a contract not yet fully performed by the parties. Prior to
the adoption of the U.C.C., if the buyer ordered and received
the goods and no mention was made of price, a reasonable price,
such as the market price or the price customarily charged by
the seller for like goods, was presumed. If, however, the con
tract was executory, in that the goods had not yet been de
livered, the contract would then have been held too indefinite
to enforce because the price term was omitted. Under the
U.C.C. an open price term may be used without worrying about
mdefiniteness, for Section 87A-2-305 of the U.C.C. as adopted by
Montana provides:
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for
sale even though the price is not settled. In such a case the
price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if
(a) nothing is said as to price; or
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they
fail to agree; or
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market
or other standard as set or recorded by a third person
agency and it is not so set or recorded.
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means
a price for him to fix in good faith.
(3) When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement
th® parties fails.to be fixed through fault of one party
the other may at his option treat the contract as cancelled
or himself fix a reasonable price.
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless
the price be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or agreed
there is no contract. In such a case the buyer must return
any goods already received or if unable so to do must pay
their reasonable value at the time of delivery and the seller
must return any portion of the price paid on account.
" m e n tT C°mmercial Code’ 1962 Official Text, Section 2-201, Com*Ibid.
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In addition to liberalizing the formal requirements under
the Statute of Frauds, the U.C.C. changes certain of the excep
tions to the operation of that statute. Under the old Statute of
Frauds partial performance of a contract made it enforceable
in its entirety whether in writing or not. For example, if part
of the goods are received and accepted by the buyer or part of
the price were paid by the buyer and accepted by the seller
the contract was fully enforceable despite the fact it was only
oral and not in writing as required by the Statute of Frauds.
This partial performance was held to be sufficient evidence of
the contractual intent of the parties to obviate the necessity
of producing a writing as evidence. Thus, by virtue of this ex
ception to the old Statute of Frauds, a contract otherwise un
enforceable because not in writing could be completely en
forced if partially performed.28 Under the U.C.C. this type of
partial performance still qualifies as an exception to the Statute
of Frauds, but the contract is only exempted from the require
ment of a writing to the extent actually performed. That is,
“partial performance as a substitute for the required memo
randum (writing) can validate the contract only for the goods
which have been accepted or for which payment has been
made and accepted.”29 Thus if only $100 of a purchase price
of $1,000 has been paid on an oral contract which the Statute
of Frauds requires to be in writing, the contract would have
been enforceable to the extent of $1,000 worth of goods under
the old statute, whereas, under the U.C.C. it would be enforce
able only for $100 worth of goods.
Another example of the limitation of exceptions to the Stat
ute of Frauds may be seen in the U.C.C. treatment of the ex
ception generally made as to goods to be specially manufac
tured. In Montana,30 as in most states, a contract for the special
manufacture of goods was exempted from the operation of the
Statute of Frauds. This exception was based on the inequity
of permitting the buyer to refuse the goods because his order
was not in writing. Expenses incurred, and time wasted in tool
ing up or acquiring materials or manufacturing unique items
not readily resalable made it manifestly inequitable to permit
' Revised. Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 74-201; Spurgeon v. Imperial
Elevator, 99 Mont. 432, 43 Pac. (2d)891.
*Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 Official Text, Section 2-201. Comment 2.

30Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 74-202.
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a buyer to raise the defense of the Statute of Frauds. Under the
prior law such a contract for the special manufacture of goods
was totally enforceable from the moment the contract was
formed though it was for a price required by the Statute of
Frauds to be in writing. Under the U.C.C. such a contract is
also enforceable even though not in writing, but only if “the
goods are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course
of the seller’s business and the seller, before notice of repudia
tion is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a sub
stantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for
their procurement.”31 Thus, under the U.C.C., the manufacturer
must have begun manufacture or made commitments for the
procurement of the goods before the contract is enforceable if
not in writing; whereas, under the law before the U.C.C. no
such change of position on the part of the manufacturer was
required.
There is one addition in the Statute of Frauds under the
U.C.C. which has no counterpart in the prior law. If an oral
contract is admitted in court, by the party against whom en
forcement is sought, in a written pleading filed with the court
or by oral testimony or stipulation, no writing is necessary to
make it enforceable even though it was required by the Statute
of Frauds to be in writing. It is stated in Section 87A-2-201 (3)
(b) of the U.C.C. as adopted by Montana that:
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of sub
section (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court
that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is
not enforceable under this provision beyond the quan
tity of goods admitted . . .

| ^ should be noted that this exception to the Statute of Frauds
which makes a contract admitted in the prescribed fashion en
forceable though not in writing is limited to the quantity of
goods actually admitted.
’’Ibid., Section 87A-2-201.
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Changes in the Principles of Contract Law
The Firm Offer Problem

In the previous discussion of the higher standard imposed by
the U.C.C. on “merchants,” it was pointed out that when it
concerns “merchants” the prior law with respect to revocation
of an offer has been changed. Prior to the U.C.C. an offer could
be revoked at any time before its acceptance. This was true
even though the person making the offer had promised to keep
the offer open for a specified time, unless the person to whom
the offer was made paid for the privilege of having it held
open, and thus acquired an “option,” or unless he materially
changed his position in reliance on the promise to hold the
offer open so as to justify the courts holding the person who
made the offer to his promise in order to avoid an unfair result.
In the absence of payment therefore, an offeror’s promise to
hold an offer open was regarded as a mere unenforceable gra
tuity. However, under the U.C.C. a written offer signed by a
“merchant” which contains an assurance that it will be held
open is irrevocable for the period specified therein, or in the
absence of a specified time, for a reasonable time not to exceed
three months.32 This is the case regardless of whether the per
son to whom the offer was made has paid any consideration or
has acted to his detriment in reliance on the offeror’s assur
ance that the offer would be held open. It is suggested, there
fore, that form contracts be checked to determine whether they
contain wording which would constitute an irrevocable offer
under the U.C.C., and that merchants refrain from giving writ
ten assurances by which they do not desire to be bound.
It should also be noted that buyers interested in an irrev
ocable offer may obtain one by providing the “merchant” of
feror with a form containing a written promise to hold it open,
but the provision making the offer irrevocable must be separ
ately signed by the person making the offer to be effective
when the person to whom the offer is made supplies the form .33
Thus both buyers and sellers should carefully investigate this
section of the U.C.C.
The Battle of the Conflicting Forms

The rigidity of the common law rules of offer and acceptance
**Ibid.f Section 87A-2-205.
831Ibid.
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in some instances created difficulties with respect to modern
business transactions. One such difficulty has come to be called
“the battle of the conflicting forms.” The use of printed forms
for all transactions of a given class by modern businesses has
become the rule rather than the exception. Though their use
is often fully justified by resultant savings of both time and
expense, such forms, however carefully drafted, have seldom
been tailored to fit the individual transaction involved. Gen
erally, both the seller’s quotation and the buyer’s response by
purchase order are on such forms, and frequently the standard
clauses used therein by the seller and the buyer will be in con
flict. This presents the problem of whether there is in fact a
contract, and if there is a contract what its terms and conditions
are. Do the buyer’s forms or those of the seller prevail?
Under the common law, if the terms of the acceptance did not
coincide exactly with the terms of the offer, there was no con
tract and the attempted acceptance became merely a counter
offer. The old rule was stated in the case of J. Neils Lumber Co.
v. Farmers Lumber Co. (88 Montana 392, 397, 293 Pac. 288,1930)
by the Montana Supreme Court as follows:
The rule is well settled that, in order to form a contract, there
must be an offer by one party and an unconditional accept
ance of it by the other in accordance with its terms . . . (cita
tions omitted) and that, if the acceptance falls within or goes
beyond the terms of the offer or makes a condition at vari
ance with the proposal, there is no contract and the transac
tion amounts to one of the proposals and counter proposals
only . . . (citations omitted).

The counteroffer terminated the original offer and there could
be no contract unless the counteroffer were subsequently ac
cepted. The conflict of terms between the offer and the ac
ceptance meant there was no contract at common law, and it
is this rule which the U.C.C. has changed, as the following will
illustrate.
Usually a seller’s quotation does not contain a promise to
sell and is regarded merely as a solicitation of an offer. The
buyer s purchase order is the offer and the existence of a con
tract and the terms thereof will be determined by the manner
in which the seller responds to that offer. At common law and
nder the U.C.C., if the seller responds with an acceptance
which does not create a conflict of term s-such as signing an
acknowledgement without additional or different terms—there
is a contract on the buyer’s terms as set forth in the purchase
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order. If the seller uses his own acknowledgement—which con
tains terms in addition to or different from those in the buyer’s
purchase order—there is no contract at common law, but there
is a contract under the new code. Section 87A-2-207 (1) of the
U.C.C. as adopted by Montana, states:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional
to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless ac
ceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the ad
ditional or different terms. (Emphasis supplied.)

The effect of the additional or different terms in the seller’s
acknowledgment on the contract thus formed is governed by
subsection (2) of Section 87A-2-207 of the U.C.C. as adopted by
Montana, as follows:
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms be
come part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of
the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice
of them is received. (Emphasis supplied.)

However, under the U.C.C., if the contract is not between mer
chants the additional or different terms in the seller’s acknowl
edgement merely fall by the wayside unless the buyer accepts
them. If the buyer does not accept them, then the contract con
tains only the terms of the buyer’s purchase order and the
seller will find that the terms of his acknowledgement are of
no avail. If, however, the contract is between merchants the
buyer should recognize that unless his offer expressly limited
acceptance to the terms of the offer, those additional terms
which do not materially alter the contract become binding
upon him unless he makes a timely objection, whether he be
lieves he accepted them or not. If the buyer did in fact limit
acceptance to the terms of the offer and the seller’s acknowl
edgement contains terms in addition to or different from those
in the buyer s purchase order, then there is no contract at all.
Even when, due to a conflict of terms, the writings of the
parties fail to create a contract, a contract may be created by
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the conduct of the parties. At common law, an acknowledge
ment by the seller which differed from the terms of the pur
chase order was regarded as a counteroffer which terminated
the buyers’ offer and no contract was formed. If, however, the
seller shipped the goods and the buyer accepted them the buyer
was held to have thereby accepted the counteroffer and was
consequently bound by the terms of the seller’s acknowledge
ment which had differed in terms from his purchase order. This
legal principle which gave the seller the “last shot” at de
termining the terms of the contract, has been changed by sub
section (3) of Section 87A-2-207 of the U.C.C. as adopted by
Montana which states:
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale al
though the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish
a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties
agree, together with any supplementary terms incorpo
rated under any other provisions of this Act. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Thus the U.C.C. does not impose the terms of the seller’s ac
knowledgment upon the buyer. The terms of the contract are
those upon which the purchase order and the acknowledge
ment agree. All additional or different terms upon which there
was no agreement are inoperative. The vacuum created by dis
carding those terms upon which there was no agreement may
be filled by applying terms generally imposed by the U.C.C.
to operate in the absence of any agreement by the parties to
the contrary. For example, in the event the provisions of the
purchase order and the acknowledgement conflict with refer
ence to the time at which the risk of loss is to be transferred
from the seller to the buyer, then the risk of loss will pass in
the manner specified by the U.C.C., as though the parties had
completely omitted any reference thereto.
The Unilateral Contract “Trick”

Under the prior law a seller who received an order to ship
goods was at liberty to regard the order as either an offer for
a bilateral contract (a promise to buy in return for a promise
to ship conforming goods) or a unilateral contract (a promise
to buy in return for the act of shipping conforming goods) If
the seller treated the order as an offer for a bilateral contract
and promised to ship conforming goods a contract was formed
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by his promise, and the subsequent shipment of nonconform*nS goods would constitute a breach of that promise for which
the buyer had redress. But to form a unilateral contract, for the
breach of which the seller could be held liable, the offer had to
be accepted by performance of the specific act requested,
that of shipping conforming goods. Thus the seller who know
ingly shipped nonconforming goods in response to the buyer’s
order in the hope of unloading them on the buyer could avoid
liability by claiming such a shipment was not the shipment of
conforming goods requested by the buyer, and therefore did not
constitute an acceptance of the offer, and that there was, there
fore, no contract, and consequently no breach of contract for
which he could be held liable.
By employing this “trick” defense a seller was free to ship
any inferior, different, or substandard goods he chose in the
hope that the buyer would be in sufficiently critical need of
the goods to accept them on arrival. The buyer, on the other
hand, was without recourse when he received such goods in
response to his order, whether he accepted them or not. The
U.C.C. has done away with this “trick” defense. Now a ship
ment of nonconforming goods is both an acceptance and a
breach of the contract formed by such acceptance unless the
seller notifies the buyer that the shipment is only offered “as
an accommodation to the buyer .”34 Because of this rule any
Montana businessman who desires to ship goods similar to
those ordered, because he does not have conforming goods in
stock and wants to “help” the buyer if he can by providing
goods which may serve the purpose, should immediately notify
the buyer that the shipment is for his accommodation. Other
wise, though he had the best of intentions, he may find himself
being held liable for breach of contract.
Modification of Contracts

Under the prior law any promise was a mere gratuity and
unenforceable unless there was some consideration therefore.
A modification of an existing contract was regarded as a new
and separate promise and some consideration for that promise
was required to make it enforceable. This rule had a tendency
to protect the original agreement from fraudulent or bad faith
claims of modification by either of the parties thereto. A seller
could not, for example, claim that the buyer had agreed to ex“Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-2-2-6 (1) (b).
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tend the time of delivery or to accept a different brand or grade
of goods than that specified in the contract unless said seller
could prove both that the buyer had in fact made the promise
and that there was consideration running to the buyer for this
new promise. Under the “pre-existing duty rule” the seller
would be doing no more than that which he was already obli
gated to do—deliver the goods—and this performance of his
pre-existing duty under the original agreement was not con
sideration for the buyer’s new promise to extend the time of
delivery or to accept a different grade or brand of goods. Un
fortunately this rule placed parties who had relied in good
faith upon a promised modification in an awkward position,
since they could not enforce the agreement unless they could
show some consideration other than performing that which
they were already obligated to do.
Under the U.C.C. an agreement modifying a contract for the
sale of goods needs no consideration to be binding,35 and this
applies to an agreement to rescind or cancel as well as an agree
ment to modify.36 The U.C.C. has endeavored to prevent false
assertions of oral modification by providing that the parties
may stipulate in the contract that it is not to be rescinded or
m°dified except by a signed writing ,37 and that the modification
must be in writing and signed by the party sought to be charged
| Jt falls within the Statute of Frauds.38 When a nonmerchant
is dealing with a merchant, however, any clause requiring writ
ten modification in a form supplied by the merchant must be
separately signed by the nonmerchant.39 Consequently, Mon
tana “merchants” who desire to limit modification to a writing
should provide a space beneath such a clause in their form contracts for the signature of the nonmerchants with whom they
deal. However, even though a written modification is required
y a specific provision in the original agreement or because the
modification falls within the Statute of Frauds, a Montana busmessman cannot, under the U.C.C., rest assured that his oral
promises modifying the agreement cannot be enforced against
im. If, for example, a buyer, knowing that both the original
agreement and the Statute of Frauds require any modification
10 be in writing, orally promises to extend the time for deliv*Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-2-209 (1)
Ioid. (2).
v'

Wm.
“Ibid. (3).

™lbid. (2).

4
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ery from ten to twenty days, said buyer may be held to have
waived his right to delivery within ten days; for under the
U.C.C., though the contract specifically requires a written mod
ification, an oral modification may operate as a waiver .40 That
is, the buyer may be held to have waived his right to perform
ance of the original terms of the agreement by orally agreeing
to other terms. Having made such a waiver, the buyer could
still retract it by notifying the seller before the seller has ma
terially altered his position in reliance on the waiver that strict
performance of the original terms will be required .41 The best
way to avoid problems of oral modification and waivers is to
specifically require in the original agreement that any modifi
cation thereof must be in writing and then to make no subse
quent oral commitments. Then any intended subsequent modi
fication may be clearly and definitely reduced to writing and
will be enforceable under the U.C.C. with or without con
sideration.
Assignments
Another change resulting from the adoption of the U.C.C. in
Montana comes under the law of assignments. Upon entering
into a contract the parties thereto acquire certain rights and
have imposed on them certain duties or obligations. A seller,
for example, has the obligation to transfer the goods to the
buyer and the right to receive the price when he has done so.
The prior law has long permitted the transfer of these rights
and obligations to a third person who was not a party to the
contract by means of an assignment. Prior to the U.C.C., how
ever, a firm distinction was made between the assignment of
rights and the delegation of duties or obligations. This distinc
tion was based on the recognition that contract rights generally
involve merely the payment of money whereas the duties of
performance may involve personal credit or personal abilities.
It generally makes little difference to whom the money must
be paid, but it may make a great deal of difference who is to
render the performance for which the payment was made. For
this reason, in Montana, as in most jurisdictions, it has been
held in the past that a general assignment of a contract trans
ferred the rights but did not result in the delegation of the
wIbid. (4).
"Ibid. (5).
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obligations to the party to whom the rights were assigned.42
The party receiving the assignment acquired the rights free
and clear of any obligations unless he expressly assumed said
obligations.
The U.C.C. adopts a more liberal position and attempts to
make both rights and duties more freely assignable. Section
87A-2-210 (4) of the U.C.C. as adopted by Montana states:
An assignment of “the contract” or of “all of my rights under
the contract” or an assignment in similar general terms is an
assignment of rights and unless the language or the circum
stances (as in an assignment for security) indicate the con
trary, it is a delegation of performance of the duties of the
assignor and its acceptance by the assignee constitutes a prom
ise by him to perform those duties. This promise is enforceable
by either the assignor or the other party to the original contract.

Thus, under the U.C.C., one who accepts a general assignment
of a contract acquires not only the right to receive payment but
the duty to perform.
The parties are, however, still permitted to prevent assign
ment of either rights or duties by so providing in the contract,
cut even here the new law operates in favor of more freely
assignable rights and duties, for Section 87A-2-210 (3) of the
U.C.C. as adopted by Montana provides:
Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary, a prohibition of
assignment of “the contract” is to be construed as b a r r i n g
the delegation to the assignee of the assignor’s performance.

Under this section the old policy of using a generally worded
clause to prohibit assignment will only prevent assignment of
neithprfh’ H °lthe nglLtS- Therefore>^ the parties intend that
neither the duties nor the rights should be assignable they must
onlTKi£f \ £ S 3 Seneral^prohibition against assignment will do
E ;,C!b'-In addltlon> should be noted that the asif* +
°if CGrta“ ri/ hts cannot be Prevented no matter how
carefully the parties draft a clause prohibiting the assignment
“
fa's
87A' 2-210 <2) °f the U C C- as a d o p t e d " "
A right to damages for breach of the whole contract or a rieht
arising out of the assignor’s due performance of his entire obli
gation can be assigned despite agreement otherwise.
"Apple v. Edwards, 92 Mont. 524, 16 Pac I2dl 7 0 0 n o io i ™ __
L.no|ln National
Life d u ra n c e Co,
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Thus, under the U.C.C. a right to bring suit for damages for
breach of the whole contract or for payment for complete per
formance of the contract is assignable notwithstanding an
agreement to the contrary. Another section of the U.C.C. treats
accounts receivable in a similar manner. Section 87A-9-318 (4)
states:
A term in any contract between an account debtor and an
assignor which prohibits assignment of an account or contract
right to which they are parties is ineffective.

These changes in the law of assignments made by the U.C.C.
and the consequent shift in the direction of more freely assign
able rights and duties are perhaps best explained by the official
comment to one of the Sections, which states:
This gradual and largely unacknowledged shift in legal doc
trine has taken place in response to economic need: as accounts
and contract rights have become the collateral which secures
an ever increasing number of financing transactions, it has been
necessary to reshape the law so that these intangibles, like nego
tiable instruments and negotiable documents of title, can be
freely assigned. (Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 Official Text,
Section 9-318, Comment 4.)

Unconscionable Contract Clauses
The U.C.C. has also changed the law with respect to the en
forcement of unconscionable (unreasonable) contract clauses.
The general rules of contract law were formulated with the
intent of binding a man rigidly to his agreement. To permit a
party to attempt to avoid his obligation or to seek to have the
courts revise it for him just because the agreement into which
he freely entered proved to work a hardship or to be unprofit
able would destroy the value of contracts altogether. The posi
tion of the Montana Supreme Court with respect to enforce
ment of clauses which might seem unreasonable was stated in
the following manner:
In this instance the defendant contracted to pay the plaintiff
for value, and whether he made a good or bad bargain is not
for the courts to determine. Rather it becomes the duty of the
courts to enforce such contracts . . . (citations omitted) not
to make new ones for the parties, however unreasonable the
terms may appear . . . (citations). Merely because the defend
ant may have reason to regret his bargain affords him no
ground to avoid the obligation of his contract. (McConnell v.
Blackley, 66 Mont. 510, 515, 214 Pac. 64 [1923].)

But there are occasions when to enforce a contract to the
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letter would be to reach an unconscionable and unjust result.
In most instances these occasions arise when one party has
taken advantage of the ignorance, culpability, or unfortunate
position of another. Frequently the courts were faced with the
problem of finding some justification for refusing to enforce
such agreements strictly to the letter. In the absence of fraud,
duress, undue influence, or some other valid defense against
such enforcement, the courts would often resort to twisting the
rules of offer and acceptance or consideration or other contract
principles in order to reach an equitable result. Consistent ap
plication of clearly defined rules of law under these circum
stances was impossible, and the result often supported the old
adage that “hard cases make bad law.”
The U.C.C. approaches the problem directly and permits the
courts to refuse to enforce all or any part of a contract which
they find to be unconscionable as a matter of law, without any
necessity of manipulating contract rules or public policy. Sec
tion 87A-2-302 of the U.C.C. as adopted by Montana, states:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the
time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the con
tract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract with
out the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the appli
cation of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any uncon
scionable result.

The question of whether a contract is unconscionable is one of
degree to be answered by the court upon hearing all the evi
dence. It is a question of whether the agreement was “so one
sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing
at the time of the making of the contract.”43 In one case, for
example, it was held that a clause limiting the time during
which complaints could be made was inapplicable to latent
defects in a shipment of catsup which could only be discovered
by microscopic analysis.44 It seems reasonable to conclude that
it will be easier under this new law for a defendant to make a
showing of unconscionability and obtain relief now that the
U.C.C. has made it easier for the court to implement the intent
of the law rather than having to enforce a contract to the letter.
“Um/orm Commercial Code, 1962 Official Text, Section 2-301, Comy
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“Consignment” or “Sale or Return”

The Montana businessmen who have relied upon the con
signment to shield goods from the creditors of an agent to
whom they were delivered for sale to third parties should be
advised that the U.C.C. has changed the law. Prior to the U.C.C.
a businessman, as consignor, who wanted an outlet for the sale
of his goods could consign them to the party who operated the
outlet, as consignee, making said consignee his agent for sale
of the goods to third parties. As there was no sale to the con
signee he acquired no title to the goods and consequently the
goods could not be reached by the consignee’s creditors nor
transferred to his trustee in bankruptcy. In addition, because
the consignor retained title to the goods he could exercise cer
tain controls over their sale to third persons, and consignee
dealers were not forced to bear the risk of finding a market or
the expense of purchasing the stock of goods. The principal
question raised in connection with this type of transaction was
whether it was in fact a consignment creating an agency or a
sale vesting title to the goods in the consignee so that they were
subject to the claims of his creditors. As long ago as 1917 the
Montana Supreme Court stated:
If the contract provides that the consignee shall pay for all
the goods delivered to him, whether they are sold and delivered
to the customers or not . . . the transaction is a sale___ On the
other hand, if the title to the goods remains in the consignor,
and undelivered goods are to be returned to it, the transaction
is one of agency, even though the consignee may be held re
sponsible for the payment of the purchase price of the goods
delivered to customers. (State v. Tuffs, 54 Mont. 20, 25, 165 Pac
1107.)

Thus, if the goods could be returned to the consignor he was
the principal of the agent consignee and retained title to the
goods which could not be reached by the creditors of the con
signee.
Under the U.C.C., however, though the consignment remains
effective as between the consignor and consignee, the creditors
of the consignee may acquire an interest in the goods superior
to that of the consignor despite the consignment. Section 87A-2326 (3) of the U.C.C. as adopted by Montana provides:
Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such per
son maintains a place of business at which he deals in goods of
the kind involved, under a name other than the name of the
person making delivery, then with respect to claims of creditors
of the person conducting the business the goods are deemed to
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be on sale or return. The provisions of this subsection are ap
plicable even though an agreement purports to reserve title to
the person making delivery until payment or resale or uses
such words as “on consignment” or “on memorandum.” How
ever, this subsection is not applicable if the person making de
livery
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor’s
interest or the like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is gen
erally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged
in selling the goods of others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the Chapter on Se
cured Transactions (Chapter 9). (Emphasis supplied.)

By deeming the goods to be “on sale or return” this section
makes goods delivered “on consignment” subject to the claims
of the creditors of the consignee to whom they are delivered,
for Section 87A-2-326 (2) states that “goods held on sale or re
turn are subject to such claims while in the buyer’s (con
signee’s) possession.” The only way the consignor may avoid
subjecting the goods to attachment or levy by the creditors of
the consignee is by complying with alternative (a), (b) or (c)
quoted as part of the subsection above, any one of which makes
the subsection inapplicable. Alternative (a) is not available to
Montana businessmen as this state has no “sign posting” law,
and alternative (b), that of proving that the consignee was
“generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged
in selling the goods of others” would be burdensome at best as
it would require the consignor to bear the burden of proof of
this fact. The only one of these three alternatives which is
reasonably available to a Montana businessman is (c) which
requires compliance with the filing provisions of the Chapter
on Secured Transactions (Chapter 9).
Thus the U.C.C. has elevated the consignment intended as
security to a “Security Agreement” to be governed by Chapter
9,45 and the filing of a financing statement in compliance with
the provisions of that Chapter is the only reasonable means of
shielding the consigned goods from the creditors of the con
signee. This change has been made as a result of a growing
antipathy toward secret liens and because the common law con
signment violated the principle of ostensible ownership; that
is, those who extend credit to the consignee should be able to
presume that property in his possession is his unless the inter
ests of others are a matter of public record or the creditor is
“Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-9-102 (2).
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advised to the contrary. It was the intent of those who drafted
the U.C.C. to see to it that the general creditors of consignees
did not rely on what appeared to be the consignee’s property
as a basis for the extension of credit. The Uniform Commercial
Code, 1962 Official Text, Section 2-326, Comment 2 states:
Pursuant to the general policies of this Act which require
good faith not only between the parties to the sales contract, but
as against interested third parties, subsection (3) resolves all
reasonable doubts as to the nature of the transaction in favor
of the general creditors of the buyer. As against such creditors,
words such as ‘on consignment1 or ‘on memorandum,’ are dis
regarded when the buyer has a place of business at which he
deals in goods of the kind involved.

It should be noted, however, that the consigned goods are not
subject to claims of the consignee’s creditors if the consignee
operates his place of business in the name of the consignor.
This is because creditors would not be apt to rely upon the con
signee s apparent ownership of goods in his possession under
these circumstances.

The Statute of Limitations
Every state imposes certain limitations on the time within
which a civil action may be brought, in order to bar stale
claims. Witnesses move away or die, records are destroyed or
misplaced, memories fade and the passage of time generally
erodes the possibility of proving facts and circumstances. For
this reason, and because it would be unreasonable to place de
fendants under constant and continuous jeopardy from civil
actions, there is a strong public policy in favor of forcing parties
to diligently pursue their remedies. Under the prior law in
Montana any legal action based on an instrument in writing
had to be commenced within eight years.40 If the action thereon
were not commenced within that time the plaintiff was barred
from recovery. If it was an action based upon a contract, ac
count, or promise not founded on an instrument in writing, the
legal proceedings had to be initiated within five years,47 and if
fraud or mistake were the basis of the action it had to be
brought within two years.48
The U.C.C. both continues and strengthens the public policy*4
4®/btd., Section 93-2603.
'‘Ibid., Section 93-2604.
4*Ibid., Section 93-2607.
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in favor of barring stale claims. Section 87A-2-725 of the U.C.C.
as adopted by Montana states:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale m ust be com
m enced w ithin f o u r y e a r s after the cause of action has
accrued. B y the original agreem ent the parties m ay reduce
the period of lim itation to not less than one year but m ay
not extend it. (Emphasis supplied.)

It should be noted that this section applies only to contracts for
sale and that it makes no distinction beween actions which are
or are not based upon a written agreement. Therefore actions
based on both oral and written contracts of sale must now be
brought within four years in Montana. This shortening of the
period of limitation from that which previously prevailed in
most states is explained in the comment to the appropriate sec
tion in the 1962 Official Text of the U.C.C. as follows:
This Article takes sales contracts out of the general law s lim it
ing the tim e for commencing contractual actions and selects a
four-year period as the most appropriate to modern business
practice. This is w ithin the normal com m ercial record keep
ing period. ( . U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l C o d e , 1962 O fficial Text, Section 2-725, Comment.)

Under this section Montana businessmen may achieve a finality
of commercial transactions within four years and need not re
tain records for a longer period for the purpose of defending
themselves against older claims. It should also be noted that
the parties to a sales contract are given some latitude in de
termining the period of limitation for themselves. They may
reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but
may not extend it.”

Conclusion

It should be remembered that the discussion herein is limited
to a portion of Chapter 2 of the U.C.C. and that the principles
mentioned apply only to sales of goods. The reader should,
therefore, carefully distinguish other contracts to which these
principles mentioned do not apply. It should also be remem
bered that this article is neither designed nor intended to take
the place of legal counsel with respect to particular problems.
iscussion of many qualifications and exceptions to various
sections of Chapter 2 might well be found by the reader’s own
counsel to apply to any given problem. We can only hope that
this article will facilitate recognition of policies and practices
which should be changed by calling to the reader’s attention
some of the more outstanding updating in the law caused by
the enactment of the U.C.C. in Montana.

W hat Price Progress?
NORMAN E. TAYLOR
Associate Director
Bureau of Business and Economic Research
University of Montana, Missoula

In the last issue of the Montana Business Quarterly, the arti
cle entitled, Living With Change” described some aspects of
our present society and its complexity. We looked at the reasons
for change, the organizing of research, the array of remarkable. new products, the pervasiveness of innovation, and the
significance of change for the individual. It would be accurate
to conclude from that discussion that “Living IS Change”_
whether we view it in biological, economic, social or other
terms. Rather than shrinking, our world is getting larger—from
the ocean depths to distant planets—our minds and our horizons
are being stretched.
In the economic history of Europe and North America there
are names of key innovators to remember: John Kay and his
Flying Shuttle, James Hargreaves and his “Spinning Jenny,”
Oliver Evans, Eli Whitney, Robert Fulton and Howard Aiken
(inventor of the Mark I, the first true computer). We forget
the unidentified and vastly more numerous thousands of people
who resisted each new technological process—who attacked
inventors and damaged factories because they feared displace
ment by a machine. These people had not learned the one in
controvertible lesson that history teaches us: that, while the
nature of work may be changed, innovation ultimately in
creases the total number of jobs to be filled.
General Charles de Gaulle said in a recent speech in Mexico
that “the world is undergoing a transformation to which no
change that has yet occurred can be compared, either in scope
or in rapidity.” An editorial in Life magazine entitled “Nine
Jobs in Your Future” argues for continuing education and the
updating of labor skills so that American workers can remain
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employable in the face of rapid technological change.1 A cen
tury ago a man could learn a trade and retire from the same
occupation; by contrast today, a worker might easily be forced
to engage in many occupations (even within a single company)
before retirement. For example, a graduate engineer has “a
half life of about ten years. Half of what he now knows will be
obsolete in ten years. Half of what he will need to know ten
years hence is not available today.”2
The magnitude of changes that we can expect in the realm
of new ideas, processes, and products is awesome; but even in
such pedestrian areas as city and residential growth our needs
are enormous. As President Johnson stated in his “Great So
ciety” speech last year: “In the remainder of this century,
urban populations will double, city land will double and we will
have to build homes, highways and facilities equal to all those
built since this country was settled. In the next forty years we
must rebuild the entire urban United States!”
Furthermore, the human animal is progressively changing.
A leading advertising executive says: “People are taller than
they used to be. And healthier. And richer. And better edu
cated. And more sophisticated. With more varied appetites.
With more cultivated tastes. With longer weekends. And wider
interests. And more hobbies. People are growing up faster. And
staying young longer. They are becoming harder to satisfy.
Harder to fool. Easier to bore.”8 Hundreds of new products to
please these “new” people appear every day. But it is argued
that there are already available too many products, at too many
prices, sizes and qualities, yet with not enough reliable infor
mation for rational choices. Many of the people holding this
view are also champions of the free enterprise system who
would resist any attempt by governments to control or tamper
with a firm’s right to decide these matters for itself. And yet
they fail to recognize that private business initiative has been
the source of most of the innovation and complexity to which
they object.
Another facet to the consumer’s problem of choice is that
most of the products and services that we consume today are
not necessities of life. If all that we really need for survival are
’Ibid <Nine J° bS ^ Y° Ur Future’” Vo1- 58> N o- n > March 19, 1965, p. 4.
B i1: ®obbs’ “What a Mess We’ve Made of Mother,” a speech given at
|ctob erM19gai 9 5 9 S
Seminar’ Metropolitan Club, N ew York City,
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a cave, a bearskin, and a club, anything else, then, is a luxury.
Most distinctions between necessities and luxuries are neither
meaningful nor consistent. They usually amount to little more
than saying “what I purchase is a necessity; everything else is
a luxury.” And many of us would “rather fight than switch”
to necessities alone. Who, then, is to determine what is too
much variety?
Until fairly recently in our business history, it was possible
for a firm to survive merely by modest aggressiveness in dispos
ing of staple goods inventories. Today, marketing research pre
cedes production activities and strongly influences product de
sign. Executives are hard-pressed to discern and anticipate what
consumers really want (not merely what they say they want)
in time to manufacture and distribute the item before competi
tors skim the same market. Retailers must choose the limited
number of products that can be accommodated on their shelves
from among thousands of alternatives. Yet new products con
tinue to appear. Nobody clamored for shirts or pants that do not
need ironing, for an electric carving knife, or for orbiting satel
lites that would relay TV signals and permit us to watch the
Olympic games as the events took place.
Hence, the primary function of many marketers is to create
demand and not merely to satisfy it. Once the laboratory has
developed the new product it must be sold. The least expensive
way to reach large audiences is through advertising. But, in
creating demand for these new products and services, adver
tising too often has become a Frankenstein’s monster which has
resulted in much that is picayune and offensive. Admittedly,
the seller s task is a difficult one when there are no real product superiorities or when a product has limited utility. Witness
the niggling claims associated with efforts to make the Ameri
can consumer desire striped toothpaste or four headlights for
his automobile. Should not a manufacturer be at least slightly
embarrassed at presentations which insult consumers of even
average intelligence? When I read a bold advertising headline
which asserts that some company has taken eight years and
spent four million dollars to improve (slightly) the closure de
vice on its beer can my reaction is: “Why would they ever ad
mit it?”
Change, new products, and advertising can all be carried to
fantastic and meaningless lengths. Do Americans really need a
chrome and silver beer can disposal for picnic use which oper
ates like a mortar and can fire an empty beer can 100 feet into J
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the bushes? A 1964 Christmas best seller of San Francisco’s
Gumps’ store was a “fondling piece” in a suede pouch, for
nervous executives made of (to use their phrase) “otherwise
useless” hunks of jade ($8.25). “Executives could also give and
get desk-scale Rolls’ Royce radiators, fused into everything
from paperweights to cigar lighters to book ends.”4 In recent
years the Nieman-Marcus store in Dallas has offered “His &
Her” jeeps and airplanes and a solid gold bone “for the dog
that has everything.” The American Cyanamid Company is
predicting $500 million a year sales of an improved garbage bag.
There is even a church in Florida which seems to have been
swept along with the tide of merchandising gimmicks: it offers
green trading stamps to the people who attend Sunday and
mid-week services.5
One of the questionable by-products of mass merchandising
efforts is the creation of unintentional values on which oppor
tunists may capitalize. Poking fun at the $10 million BristolMyers Vitalis campaign, two college students struck it rich by
marketing “Greasy Kid Stuff.” Brand X cigarettes (“The ciga
rette that always come in second—it costs a little more but
remember, it promises a little less”) which started as a spoof
found a surprising market demand.
How many of us have a negative reaction to advertisers that
admonish us not to be “half-safe” or to those who rant end
lessly about the virtues of a pill for an ailment for which medi
cal science has found no cure? Appeals such as “There are cer
tain talents to owning an Imperial,” or “The man who thinks
for himself smokes Viceroys,” do not move me either to buy
or to have a favorable attitude toward the seller. Who is not
offended by this caption: “For the first time in your life feel
really clean”? There is the Wisconsin television dealer who,
in his eagerness to sell a used TV set, represented it as being
in excellent condition “because it had been owned by a little
old lady with weak eyes.” This type of classic irrelevance hope
fully will disappear.
It has been estimated that Madison Avenue presents 1500
advertising messages daily to the average U. S. consumer; no
wonder we sometimes are confused and frustrated. In the
welter of ideas screaming for notice, it is easy to see how copy
'T im e ,

“The Business of Giving,” Vol. 84, No. 23, December 4, 1964, dd

100- 102.

"S a t u r d a y R e v i e w ,

“A ll God’s Chillun Got Stamps,” Vol. XLIV, No. 38

September 23, 1961, p. 7.
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writers and others in the industry might be tempted to employ
questionable logic or techniques if only they have attention
value. Fortunately, not all advertising people are content with
the state of their craft. Here is part of a speech by Whit Hobbs
of Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc. that indicates Madi
son Avenue can get more annoyed even than many of the con
sumers it is trying to reach.
A housewife in a supermarket is a lonely girl; there’s no
friendly grocer at her elbow to help her. There are 5,000 items
on the shelves. And last year, 6,000 n e w items were intro
duced to her. That’s 20 new products every single shopping
day. This is a real confused character, and she needs help. Con
sider for a moment the state of her crowded mind as she lugs
through the crowded aisles. She is worried about her tired
blood, and the laxative habit, and denture breath, and lowerback pains, and clogged sinuses, and rough, red hands. Her
hair is dull, her pores are large, her skin is dry, her scalp is
itchy. Her stomach valve keeps letting out more A’s than B’s
and her stomach acid keeps burning holes in her handkerchief.
She’s never felt really clean before, and even now she only
feels half safe. Worst of all, it turns out that her bra isn’t a
liv in g bra; for some reason, it just lies there. Advertising did
all this . . . what a mess w e’ve made of Mother. Isn’t it time we
stopped yelling at her and nagging her and confusing her and
talking down to her and boring her? . . .
. . . Let’s stop doing ads in which ecstatic housewives s m e ll
their towels. And lie down, apparently cold sober, and r o ll
th e m s e lv e s u p in their luxurious new livingroom rug. And
caress their 2-ply double soft, double strength, facial quality
negligee-colored to ile t p a p e r . Let’s treat toilet paper like
nothing more nor less than what it is; toilet paper. .
. . . Let s have the breakfast scenes in which everyone isn’t so
goddam cheerful. And the refrigerator isn’t neatly packed with
$700 worth of beautifully glazed hams and picture book parfaits
and impossibly high cakes—and not a leftover in sight. .
. . . Let s find children who ta lk like children—and say things
that children say, instead of ‘Gosh all jiminy, nice Mommy
this cough syrup tastes as good as the syrup you put on icey
cream.’ . . §
. . . Can’t we, in the next ten years, get all the nasty little weasels
out of our ads? And the men in the white coats trying to pass
for doctors. Can’t we stop opening and closing all those miser
able trapdoors? And sloshing around in clogged, throbbing
sinus passages? Can’t we get out of biology and back into adver
tising?6

As adman David Ogilvy has observed, “The consumer is no
moron. She is your wife.”
Hobbs, op. cit.
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Most of us would not hesitate to affirm the sentiments ex
pressed above. Even so, the instructions given out by adver
tisers and their agencies make it a minor miracle that any
program or commercial is ever aired, even the atrocious ones.
A leading magazine reports the problem thus:
T estifying before the FCC, the elders of the advertising pro
fession reported on the infinitely detailed sponsor’s com m and
ments that govern TV’s script carpenters. Sam ples:
M cCann-Erickson for L iggett & M yers (C hesterfields, L &
M’s): no portrayal of pipe or cigar sm oking or chew ing. . . .
While w e do not w ant to create an im pression of one continual,
sm oke-filled room, from tim e to tim e in the show s w e feel
‘natural* sm oking action is a requisite by the cast. We don’t
want public criticism in encouraging the too young or ‘too young
looking’ to sm oke. On the other hand, the high school and col
lege m arket is extrem ely im portant to Liggett & M yers as fu
ture long-tim e custom ers. . . .
• : • D ancer-Fitzgerald-Sam ple for G eneral M ills (W heaties,
K ix, Cheerios): There w ill be no m aterial that m ay give of
fense, either directly or by inference, to any organized m inor
ity group, or section of the country, or a com m ercial organiza
tion of any sort. This w ill be taken to include political organi
zations; fraternal organizations; college and school groups;
labor groups, religious orders; civic clubs, m em orial and patri
otic societies; philanthropic and reform societies (A nti-Tobacco
League, for exam p le); athletic organizations; w om en’s groups,
etc. . . . W here it seem s fittin g the characters should reflect
recognition and acceptance of the world situation in their
thoughts and actions, although in dealing w ith war, our w riters
should m inim ize the ‘horror’ aspects. . . . R eferences to other
cowboy stars should not be used. . . . R eferences should not be
made to ‘com petitive’ horses such as ‘Trigger,’ ‘S ilver,’ e t a l.
Not included in the FCC testim ony w as this directive issued by
the Prate, Preen and Blough A gency for B lastw ell Inc., a sm allarms manufacturer:
Com petitive m ethods of ‘death’ dealing, such as head-bashing,
ax-hacking, plank-w alking or feeding to soldier ants are pro
hibited on our private-eye show, J o h n n y C o n t u s i o n . N ot all
actors need be armed, but w here it seem s ‘natural,’ B lastw ell
pistols should be worn. It is absolutely essential that all pistol
shots hit their targets. ‘D eath’ should be sw ift and sure, but
on the other hand there should be no shots of m essy or dis
satisfied-looking ‘corpses.’ Children under six should show a
natural interest in B lastw ell firearm s, but should not be a l
lowed to fire a gun, excep t in special circum stances.7

The bases for such restrictive directives are fairly obvious.
However, a recent incident of “rigged research” underlines
Time, “1,000 Tim es No,” Vol. 76, No. 19, N ov. 7, 1960, pp. 87-88.
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the vulnerability of an agency, and gives a new reason for
exercising caution. The discovery that a physician had fabri
cated some research results led to the conviction of the manu
facturing firm and its president for criminal attempt to defraud
the public through false and misleading advertising. What is
novel in this bit of litigation is that the advertising agency
which handled the Regimen account itself was found guilty of
similar criminal charges and was fined $50,000 . . . “The first
time, according to lawyers, that an agency has been legally
punished for advertising the claims of its client.”8
It is too early to tell what this augurs for consumers; but, if
similar prosecutions follow, it may be that our confidence in
advertising claims can be partially restored. Who knows, pos
sibly even a laundry soap manufacturer may join Avis and
Vice President Humphrey in claiming the “No. 2 spot,” instead
of insisting along with dozens of other producers that it alone
makes clothes “cleanest, whitest and brightest.”
The foregoing discussion calls to mind the popular expres
sion “it takes two to tango.” To the extent that consumers are
not discriminating, whether through laziness, ignorance, or in
competence, products of questionable utility will continue to
be sold. The failure of consumers to exercise their veto power
by not purchasing invites continued exploitation. And the same
holds for bad advertising; the purchase of products so pro
moted, encourages more inanities. Before appreciable change
for the better is likely to develop in the types of products of
fered and in the promotional effort supporting them, entre
preneurs must be convinced that shoddy merchandise and
highly emotional buying motives have no market appeal. One
would hope that both parties might in the future improve their
standards of choice and behavior. We should not encourage
waste, tastelessness, and extravagance simply because we can
afford them.
If space permitted we might elaborate on other aspects of
the merchant-consumer relationship which could be improved.
A few years ago we heard much about “rigged TV shows” and
“payola scandals.” Recently we have been hearing about hid
den interest charges, slack fill, inadequate testing of powerful
drugs, misrepresentation in TV commercials, bait advertising,
fictitious pricing, and so on. Does this mean that merchants
today are less ethical or moral than they were? Not at all. The
sFrom a news story in T h e W a ll S tr e e t J o u rn a l, June 30, 1965, p. 12.
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truth is that business practice is of a higher standard than ever
before; what is changing even more quickly, though, is the con
sumer. Although today’s average consumer is smarter than
ever before, she has not yet learned to discriminate—she does
not yet appreciate her potential power. The practices that con
sumers object to will be changed. Exceptionally perceptive
business executives observe that more and more customers are
refusing to buy poorly manufactured goods and unwanted
services. Spenders want to deal with reliable firms; they will
patronize sellers who can offer genuine values and avoid those
who cannot. Enlightened business organizations are becoming
deeply involved, as they should be, in values that are more
important than simple material rewards.
We have seen that change is ubiquitous, inevitable, and ac
celerating. In science and technology, in education and busi
ness practices, in broad economic, political and demographic
terms, innovation is a circumstance of 20th century life that
cannot be ignored. Our attitudes and values are variable and
even our language is subject to alteration from many stimuli.
,r those who are inclined to fear or resent change, there are
stul many areas wherein improvement is still possible. The
difficulties of adjustment to new situations may be less than
those associated with living with the present plight.
, *n the area of business-consumer relationships that we have
been discussing there is much that can yet be done to lessen
riction and frustrations. Singly, or in groups, consumers must
help manufacturers and retailers to become better informed
regarding buyers’ attitudes toward advertising and products,
sellers must become convinced that the questionable activities
cited are not good business. When this occurs, a new dignity
and mutual trust will be possible in our trading relationships.

The Business Outlook
MAXINE C. JOHNSON
Assistant Director
Bureau of Business and Economic Research
University of Montana, Missoula

The Nation
As the summer draws to a close, the United States economy
continues to boom along, under the heady influence of the
longest business expansion in the nation’s peacetime history.
July marked the 53rd straight month of economic expansion
and most businessmen were far too busy to worry much about
suggestions of possible trouble spots. Personal incomes con
tinued to increase; and unemployment, at 4.7 percent of the
labor force in June, was the lowest in eight years, although
still higher than most people would like to see it.
In truth, remarkably few problems threaten the U.S. econ
omy at the moment, although more may develop in 1966. And,
in these few areas, many economists feel that if government
and business, labor and the public in general continue to exer
cise the good judgment and restraint which they have exhibited
during the past few years, the present expansion can continue.
The greatest uncertainties seem to exist on the international
scene, where monetary problems and the military situation in
Asia continue to plague policymakers. The U.S. balance of pay
ments is approaching an equilibrium, but international mone
tary reform moves appear to be stymied. The most realistic
assumption with respect to Vietnam appears to be that the
United States will continue to expand its role in the war and
that defense spending will increase.
Here at home opinions differ as to whether inflation is a
major threat, or whether the expansion is likely to run out of
gas. Prices have been remarkably stable during recent years
and unless current wage negotiations should produce exces
sive wage increases (out of line with productivity gains), most
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observers see little threat of inflation. The likelihood of a slow
down in the rate of expansion seems somewhat greater. During
the latter part of this year, increased social security payments
and excise tax reductions will provide more consumer purchas
ing power. However, beginning in January 1966, increased
social security taxes will take an additional $5 billion per year
from the pockets of employers and businessmen, thus eliminat
ing that amount of potential purchasing power. The federal
budget currently is swinging from a deficit to a surplus on a
cash basis, providing a further deflationary effect (Vietnam
developments conceivably could change this). Should total
business and consumer spending show signs of faltering, how
ever, there is little doubt that the federal government will move
quickly toward a more expansionary fiscal policy, either by
cutting income taxes again, to prevent the government from
pulling too much money out of the economy, or by other
measures.
While these and other possible trouble spots were being de
bated by economists, preliminary estimates of the economy’s
performance during the second quarter interjected a cheerful
note. Instead of the $6 billion to $7 billion increase in gross
national product predicted, 2nd quarter GNP was $9.2 billion
above the first quarter of 1965. Estimated at $658 billion (an
nual rate), this growth reflected increases in spending by con
sumers and government and in the surplus of exports over im
ports. Businesses, after stockpiling steel in the first quarter,
added to their inventories at a slower rate during April-June,
but the rate of investment in plant and equipment combined
was a little higher. Spending for residential construction—of
interest to Montanans— increased only slightly and housing
activity was described as “sluggish.”
Although the $9.2 billion total increase in GNP was sub
stantially smaller than the unusual $14.4 billion advance be
tween the fourth quarter of 1964 and the first quarter 1965, it
was large enough to lend credence to the widely held belief that
the present expansion is far from over. The rate of growth may
slow down, but business over the U.S. as a whole could con
tinue to get better for some time to come..

The State
In Montana, 1965 probably will be the best year since 1962.
In both 1963 and 1964, reduced farm income and limited growth
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in nonagricultural employment prevented the state from shar
ing in the national growth which has been taking place. Total
personal income remained stable at approximately $1.5 billion
between 1962 and 1964, and total employment has shown little
change since 1963. This year, however, agricultural prospects
are brighter, with the crop outlook excellent at midyear and
with cattle prices considerably higher than a year ago. Esti
mates by the Unemployment Compensation Commission indi
cate that nonagricultural employment is increasing moder
ately thanks to growing numbers of workers in construction,
retail trade, and state and local government. The outlook for
jobs during the remainder of the year is good. Unemployment
is low, approximately 4.3 percent of the labor force is without
work. It should be noted that unemployment remains low be
cause many job-seekers move out of the state to look for work,
rather than because of any significant increase in employment
opportunities.
Unless unfavorable weather developments affect what now
promises to be an unusually good wheat crop, personal income
in Montana should increase this year and the state should begin
1966 in the best economic condition in several years. Neverthe
less, we have a long way to go before we approach the growth
records now being set by the United States economy.

Myths and Misconceptions About
Montana's State and Local Taxes
JOHN H. WICKS
Assistant Professor of Economics
University of Montana, Missoula

As a topic of conversation in Montana, nothing beats increases
in the amount of state and local taxation. While it is not a pop
ular fact, there has been an almost fourfold increase in the
number of dollars of taxes collected by the state of Montana
and by local governmental units—such as counties and cities—
in the 17 years following World War II.
However, consideration only of actual dollar figures during
this period of time can produce distorted results. This distor
tion is caused by leaving out certain other factors—namely the
general price level, population, and income—in making such a
comparison. This article should help to show how yearly Mon
tana tax collections since 1946-47 can take these factors into
account to obtain a more meaningful view of what really has
been happening to the level of taxation.
Since the 1946-47 fiscal year, taxes levied by the state gov
ernment have gone up in every year except 1952-53. Taxes in
1963-64 were 396 percent of 1946-47 taxes. The top line in Fig
ure 1 compares the state tax collections in each year since 194647 to that base year. The top line in Figure 2 shows the same
information for state plus local taxes. The reader can see that
the two lines are very similar.
However, during this same 17-year period the general price
level increased by nearly 50 percent. Specifically, the goods
purchased by the typical consumer cost 47.7 percent more in
1963-64 than they did in 1946-47. This is the same as saying that
each dollar of tax collected in 1963-64 had purchasing power of
only about 67.7 percent as much as a dollar of tax collected in
the base period. Since the general price level has increased dur
ing almost every year since 1946, the purchasing power of the
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taxes collected has become progressively less per dollar of
taxes.
The taxpayer’s actual burden can be measured by the reduc
tion of his purchasing power. Thus, to compare the total burden
of taxes collected in different years, it is necessary to compare
the lost purchasing power rather than the simple dollar
amounts. The purchasing power for each year can be computed
by dividing the amount of taxes collected by the consumer
FIGURE 1
( 1946*47 — 100)

Fiscal \ ear

^ ° y /ce: biennial Reports, Montana State Board of Equalization, Helena,
Montana.

price index, which is a mathematical measure of the average
cost of living computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The second line from the top in Figures 1 and 2 compares the
purchasing power of the taxes collected in each year since 194647 with that base year. These lines show that although there is
considerable increase in the taxes expressed in purchasing
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power terms, the amount of increase is much less than for the
taxes expressed in dollar terms.
Since it is people who ultimately pay all taxes, the degree of
lost purchasing power depends upon the number of people
over which the tax is spread. Probably the best way to take
this factor into account is to express the burden on a per capita
basis. Per capita burden is computed by dividing the purchas
ing power of taxes collected by Montana population for each
year. The solid lines in Figures 1 and 2 compare the per capita
purchasing power of taxes in each year with the 1946-47 base
FIGURE 2
(iaifj-17—loo)

year. On this basis, the comparative burden of taxation has just
slightly more than doubled since World War II, instead of in
creasing fourfold as the dollar increase implies.
The actual burden borne by taxpayers in a state may also be
measured by computing the percentage of personal income paid
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in taxes. Personal income is the sum of all net income received
by individuals—out of which they can spend, save, and pay
taxes. Thus, the portion of income devoted to taxes can be
measured in terms of the individual’s resources with which to
pay them. The dotted lines in Figures 1 and 2 compare the
portion of income devoted to taxation in each year to the portion used for taxes in the 1946-47 base year. The pattern is very
similar to the pattern of the per capita purchasing power of
taxes. The tax burden, when measured as a percentage of in
come, has increased by about 90 percent since 1946-47, as op
posed to the nearly 300 percent that gross tax collections have
increased.
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the desirability
or undesirability of a 90 percent increase, or whether such an
increase is as large as it sounds. Higher standards of govern
mental services and an expansion of such activities as law en
forcement, superhighways, and higher education simply cost
more. Whether such factors are worthwhile or not is left to the
reader. However, both costs and values become more meaningu when one keeps in mind how many dollars of an increase in
tax collections represent an actual growth in the level of gov
ernmental operations, and how many dollars simply reflect an
increase in prices and population.

W hat’s Happening in Retail Trade?
MAXINE C. JOHNSON
Assistant Director
Bureau of Business and Economic Research
University of Montana, Missoula

Like the family farm, small business has long been one of the
most sacrosanct of American institutions. Small businesses do
make an important contribution to the national economy; and
in Montana, with its small communities and sparse population,
they occupy a particularly significant place, especially that
large group of firms engaged in retail trade. Commerce—par
ticularly retailing—is the major function of many Montana
cities and towns, and together with the farmer and rancher, re
tail merchants rank as leading employers in the state. But, like
the farmer and the rancher, retailers are in the midst of a pe
riod of change which promises to create a very different in
dustry pattern in the future.

The Over-all Picture
In 1963, the total sales of 7,797 retail establishments in Mon
tana amounted to $965,734,000. These firms provided employ
ment for approximately 32,500 wage and salary workers and
7,195 proprietors, or owners (Table 1). All of these figures
except the employment estimate come from the 1963 Census
of Business1 and, when compared to data from earlier censuses
taken in 1954 and 1958, they confirm some of the changes which
have been occurring in recent years.
For example, the number of retail stores is declining. There
were over 400 (5 percent) fewer retail businesses in 1963 than
there were in either 1954 or 1958. Total sales, on the other hand,
TJ. S. Bureau of the Census, C e n s u s o f B u s i n e s s , 1 9 6 3 , R e t a i l T r a d e :
M o n t a n a , BC 63-RA 28, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washing
ton, D. C., 1964.
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are increasing. They amounted to approximately $966 million
in 1963—an increase of 24 percent over 1954 and 12 percent over
1958. Of course, part of this increase was a reflection of higher
prices rather than an increase in the physical amount of goods
sold. If we take rising prices into account and convert total
sales to constant, 1954 dollars (also given in Table 1), the in
creases were considerably smaller. But whether comparisons
are made in terms of current dollars or deflated dollars, Mon
tana’s increase in retail sales has been considerably smaller
than the growth reported by retailers in the country as a whole.
Yearly figures from the Unemployment Compensation Com
mission of Montana indicate there were approximately 7 per
cent more wage and salary workers employed in the state’s
retail outlets in 1963 than in 1954.2 During the same years, the
number of persons employed by retail stores throughout the
nation increased 16 percent.3 In both Montana and the United
States, average annual sales per employee appear to have been
around $30,000.
The loss of 400 retail stores in Montana probably occurred
chiefly among the smaller stores. Nevertheless, most retail out
lets in Montana still are very small businesses, at least in terms
of number of employees. During the first quarter of 1962, 57
percent of Montana retail firms reporting to the Social Security
Administration had between one and four employees and 82
percent employed from one to eight workers.4 These figures
do not include small family-operated firms with no paid em
ployees, and there are a good many of these. Although their
numbers are declining and although their share of the market
may be getting smaller, it obviously will be some time before
small businesses are extinct in Montana.
Perhaps the most interesting changes revealed by the Census
reports are the changes taking place in the geographic pattern
of retail activity and the very different rates of growth or de
cline in various kinds of businesses. Given the state’s recent his“Census of Business figures for m id-Novem ber of Census years do not
necessarily give an accurate picture of changes in year-round em ploy
ment.
8M a n p o w e r R e p o r t o f th e P r e s id e n t a n d A R e p o r t on M a n p o w e r R e
q u ire m e n ts , R e so u rc e s, U tiliza tio n , a n d T ra in in g b y th e U n ite d S ta te s
D e p a r tm e n t o f L a b o r , transmitted to the Congress March 1964, U. S.

Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1964.
4U. S. Bureau of the Census, C o u n ty B u sin e ss P a tte r n s , First Quarter
1962, Part 9, Mountain States, U. S. Government Printing Office, W ash
ington, D. C., 1963.
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tory of limited growth in population and income, there was no
reason to anticipate anything other than modest gains in total
retail sales and employment. And the most casual observer has
been aware that the growth has been taking place in the larger
urban centers. As the urban population of Montana has grown,
new retail facilities have appeared in the larger towns and
cities. On the other hand, the hometown seed and feed, the fam
ily drugstore, the hardware or mercantile store in rural areas
is suffering from a lack of customers. The trend toward con
solidation of farm and ranch units and the movement of rural
families to the cities has produced many empty store windows
on many small town main streets.
The growth disparity in kinds of businesses shows up clearly
when we see that although there were 426 fewer retail outlets
of all types in the state in 1963 than in 1954, there were 141 (15
TABLE 2
RETAIL ESTABLISHMENTS IN MONTANA, 1954, 1958, AND 1963
„ .
Kmd o f B u sin ess

Total number of establishments
Lumber, building materials,
hardware, farm equipment
dealers
General merchandise stores
Food stores
Automotive dealers
Gasoline service stations
Apparel, accessory stores
Furniture, home furnishings,
equipment stores
Eating, drinking places
Eating places
Drinking places
Drug, proprietary stores
Other retail stores
Nonstore retailers

1954

8,223

1958

1963

P ercen t Change
195419581963
1963

8,261 7,797

5

6

849
790
684
365
397
317
1,294 1,175
993
490
485
485
934 1,048 1,075
439
428
450

—19
—23
1
15
2

—13
20
—15
0
2
5

346
343
336
2,072 2,170 2,025
924 1,095 1,063
1,144 1,075
962
240
261
260
961
968
901
233
196
271

— 3
— 2
15
—16
8
— 6
16

—2
—7
— 3
—10
0
—7
38

13

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, C e n s u s o f B u s i n e s s , 1 9 6 3 , R e t a i l
T r a d e : M o n t a n a , BC63-RA28, U. S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C., 1964 and C e n s u s o f B u s i n e s s , 1 9 5 8 , R e t a i l T r a d e :
M o n t a n a , BC58-RA26, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D. C., 1960.

percent) more gasoline stations to service the growing numbers
of automobiles. There were also 139 (15 percent) more eating
places, in the face of a very modest increase in sales by those
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businesses. Of course, in contrast to some other retail lines, it
doesn’t take much money for an individual to get into the gaso
line or the restaurant business. But while increases were oc
curring in the number of gas stations and cafes, a decline of
165 (19 percent) in the number of lumber, building materials,
hardware, and farm equipment dealers was taking place, and
the number of food stores dropped by 23 percent, from 1,294 to
933 (Table 2).
It is in the food store group that some of the most pronounced
changes are taking place. Between 1954 and 1963, the number
of outlets declined at the same time that combined sales of
TABLE 3
RETAIL SALES IN MONTANA, 1954, 1958, AND 1963
(thousands of dollars)
K ind of B usiness

1954

Total retail sales
778,033
Lumber, building materials,
hardware, farm equipment
dealers
105,636
General m erchandise stores
66,610
Food stores
155,300
Autom otive dealers
152,998
Gasoline service stations
55,584
Apparel, accessory stores
36,091
Furniture, home furnishings, equipm ent stores
32,335
Eating, drinking places
80,815
Drug, proprietary stores
20,909
Other retail stores
67,017
Nonstore retailers
4,738

P ercen t 1Changi
195419581963
1963

1958

1963

862,577

965,734

24

12

111,176
74,418
191,866
162,835
69,319
42,899

107,937
87,635
210,378
198,218
83,955
48,433

2
32
36
30
51
34

— 3
18
10
22
21
13

32,343
81,362
27,419
63,419
5,521

34,177
89,237
31,803
63,101
10,860

6
10
52
— 6
129

6
10
16
0
97

Source: See Table 2.

Montana food stores were expanding faster than sales in most
other retail lines (Table 3). Clearly, the larger grocery stores—
the supermarkets—have eliminated many small stores. A good
many more are likely to disappear in coming years.
During the past ten years, Montanans have been rearranging
their spending patterns, too. They now spend a smaller part of
their incomes in eating and drinking places, on furniture, home
furnishings, and household appliances, and in the lumber,
building materials, hardware and farm equipment retail
groups. In contrast, other kinds of businesses—food stores, auto
mobile dealers, gas stations, department stores, and drug stores
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boosted their share of consumer expenditures in 1963. Of
particular interest is the fact that Montanans have more than
doubled their purchases from nonstore retailers such as mail
order firms and house-to-house salesmen. Like other Ameri
cans, Montanans also are devoting a larger portion of their conexpenditures to personal services; between 1954 and
191 ’ ™ le they Were increasing purchases at retail stores by
only 24 percent, their spending for services—in hotels and moTABLE 4
RETAIL SALES IN MAJOR MONTANA TRADE CENTERS,
1954, 1958, AND 1963
(thousands of dollars)
City

Greal; Falls
B illings
Missoula
®UJte
£ e ?n a „
K alispell
Bozeman
™ v r e _..
Miles City
Lewistown
Glasgow
®ldney .
Anaconda
Glendive
Bivmgston
Total, 15 cities
Percent of state
sales

1954

1958

1963

79,884
83,546
43,190
61,544
29,333
28,222
19,975
21,629
16,813
14,945
12,722
9.713
15,013
12,771

98,207 119,238
100,916 109,617
53,238
70,635
63,673
61,244
34,592
41,322
28,205
34,653
25,147
33,630
23,141
21,721
20,076
21,380
14,802
20,253
13,350
19,584
11,255
16,129
17,686
15,942
11,956
14,831
1 1 ,7 4 3
i 4)879
1 4 ,7 5 2
461,043 531,123 614,931
59

62

1 9 &
49

31
64
0
41
23

21
—

68

0
27
36
54
66
6

16

26

33

—

9
33
4

19
23
34
6
6
37
47

43

— 10

24
— 1
16

64

Source: See Table 2 .

tels, auto repair shops, beauty and barber shops and so forth—
rose 55 percent.5
In a report for the Upper Midwest Research and Developmerit Council John R. Borchert and Russell B. Adams classi
fied retail trade centers and mapped trade areas for the larger
*MontanaGBC
’GCe^ sus of Busin^ s, 1963>Selected Services,
D. C. 1964BC 63"SA 28, U‘ S- Government Printing Office, Washington,
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centers in Montana and the other Upper Midwest states.0 The
report recognized four major trade centers in the state: Bil
lings, Great Falls, Butte, and Missoula. Eleven smaller Mon
tana towns were classified as complete shopping centers: Ana
conda, Bozeman, Glasgow, Glendive, Havre, Helena, Kalispell,
Lewistown, Livingston, Miles City, and Sidney. Trade areas
were drawn for each of the fifteen centers (Figure 1). Together,
the trade areas encompass all of Montana except for the ex
treme northeast corner of the state (Daniels, Sheridan, and
Roosevelt counties) which is included in the Williston, North
Dakota trade area.
In 1963, retail establishments in the four larger trade centers
—Great Falls, Billings, Butte, and Missoula—accounted for 37
percent of total retail sales in the state and outlets in the eleven
smaller centers accounted for another 27 percent of sales. This
left only 36 percent to be divided among retailers in 331 smal
ler centers and hamlets in Montana.
A quick glance at Table 4 indicates that the leading trade
centers have had very different experiences in recent years,
reflecting varying economic developments in their areas. The
effect of reduced employment in mining and smelting opera
tions on retailers in Anaconda and Butte is clearly revealed,
with a decline of 10 percent in sales in Anaconda and of 4 per
cent in Butte between 1958 and 1963. The disappointing record
of Billings retailers, especially after 1958, was due partly to the
loss of some oil company activities.
Federal government programs were a significant influence
in at least three cities. The 47 percent increase in sales from
1958 to 1963 in Glasgow was largely attributable to the Air
Force Base, and missile workers in the Great Falls and Lewistown areas were responsible for high retail sales in those cities
in 1963, although between 1954 and 1958 both Glasgow and
Lewistown had been among towns with the least growth in re
tail sales; indeed, Lewistown had experienced a slight decline.
In 1964, the year after the Census of Business was taken, sales
of Great Falls and Lewistown retailers reflected the loss of
missile workers who had left the area after completion of the
missile complex; Glasgow apparently will be faced with the
loss of military personnel in the near future.
“John R. Borchert and Russell B. Adams, T r a d e C e n te r s a n d T ra d e
A r e a s o f th e U p p e r M id w e s t, Urban Report Number 3, Upper M idwest
Research and D evelopm ent Council, M inneapolis, Minnesota, Septem
ber 1963.
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A Closer Look at Missoula
On the basis of Census sales figures, Missoula among the four
larger Montana cities and Bozeman among the smaller towns
stand out as the retailing centers with the most consistent and
rapid growth since 1954. Sidney also makes a good showing
for the years in which the Census was taken; its performance
has been somewhat erratic, however, chiefly because of its
heavier dependence on farm income.
Census figures for the state and for cities and counties re
veal many of the geographic changes taking place in retail
trade patterns, but they give almost no information about one
of the most frequently discussed retailing trends within the
cities—the move away from downtown business areas to neigh
borhood shopping centers or to business districts on the edge
of town. This is a nationwide, post-World War II development
which was a little slow in coming to Montana; it has been espe
cially noticeable here since the mid-1950’s. Frequently such de
velopments have increased retailing efficiency or have made
shopping more convenient. At the same time, some downtown
business areas have suffered. Small, independent merchants
sometimes have been hurt by the chain stores which occupied
the shopping centers. And, in several communities, some people
have felt that the growth in retail facilities was too rapid, that
it has outpaced the growth in population and income.
Since Bureau personnel are located in Missoula, a limited
study of retail growth in that city, where all these problems
obtain, was undertaken. In addition to a broad survey of retail
growth in the city, the question of overbuilding of retail facili
ties was considered. Of course, the results for Missoula should
not be interpreted as representative of other cities in the state;
we have already noted that Missoula is not a typical Montana
town in terms of retail development. However, the study con
ducted was very simple and the comparisons used might be
of interest to businessmen in other Montana towns.
Missoula’s trade area, as defined by the Upper Midwest
study, includes all of Missoula, Sanders, Mineral, Ravalli, and
Granite counties, the southern half of Lake County (including
Poison) and the northern half of Powell County. The present
population of this area is approximately 86,000, with over half
this number living in the Missoula urban area.7 Other towns in
7Based on State Board of H ealth county estim ates for 1963.
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the trade area include Hamilton with a 1960 population of
2,475; Poison, with 2,314; and Thompson Falls, Superior, Ronan
and Philipsburg, all with populations ranging from 1,100
to 1,400.8
In the whole Missoula trade area population has grown at a
slightly lower rate than in the state as a whole. Following the
state pattern of a shift to urban residence, practically all the
population increase has occurred in the Missoula urban area
while the surrounding rural areas and the small towns have
either barely maintained their numbers or have lost residents.
Between 1950 and 1960, the total population increase for the
area amounted to 12 percent, compared to 14 percent for Mon
tana as a whole. But over the same years, Missoula County’s
population (dominated by the Missoula urban area) increased
26 percent, while the population of the rest of the trade area
declined 1 percent.9
In income growth the Missoula trade area surpassed all other
state areas. Between 1954 and 1962 (latest year for which coun
ty estimates are available) total personal income increased
approximately 45 percent in the state and 59 percent in the
Missoula trade area, from $106.0 million to $168.7 million.
Again, most of the increase occurred in Missoula County, al
though neighboring counties also had creditable rates of
growth; only Mineral County fell below the state norm. In
spite of the good growth record, per capita incomes in most of
the area remain low. Only in Missoula County does per capita
income approach the state figure. In 1960, when per capita in
come in the state was $2,004, Missoula County had an income
of $2,015 per person; Sanders and Granite counties had per
capita incomes of around $1,810 and $1,860, respectively; and
incomes per person in Lake, Mineral, and Ravalli ranged from
$1,390 to $1,510.10
.1 j
Not surprisingly, the rather impressive growth in income in
the Missoula trade area was accompanied by a rapid expansion
SU. S. Bureau of the Census, C en su s o f P o p u la tio n : 1960, N u m b e r o f In
h a b ita n ts, M o n ta n a , Fiscal Report P C (1)-28A , U. S. Government Print
ing Office, Washington, D. C., 1960.
'In combining county data to establish trade area statistics, the north
ern half of P ow ell County, which in 1960 contained 569 persons and
very little retail activity, w as omitted. Data for all of Lake County were
used, including the northern half of the county w ith 1,254 residents in
1960.
“Estimated by the Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Univer
sity of Montana, Missoula. Per capita income estim ates are available
only for years in which a Census of Population was taken.
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in retail sales. Between 1954 and 1963, according to the Census
of Business, sales of retail outlets in the area increased 43 per
cent—compared to a growth of 24 percent for the state as a
whole. The discrepancy in growth rates has widened since
1958, with Missoula trade area sales expanding 23 percent and
total state sales only 12 percent. In view of the population and
TABLE 5
CHANGES IN POPULATION, PERSONAL INCOME, AND RETAIL
SALES IN MONTANA AND THE MISSOULA TRADE AREA,
SELECTED YEARS
Population
A rea

Montana, total
Missoula trade area
Missoula County
Trade area, except
Missoula County

1950

I960

P e r ce n t Change

591,024
74,266
35,493

674,767
83,039
44,663

14
12
26

38,773

38,376

— 1

Personal Income
A rea

Montana, total
Missoula trade area
Missoula County
Trade area, except
Missoula County

1954

1962

$1,071,000,000
106,005,000
60,074,000

$1,558,000,000
168,671,000
100,141,000

45
59
67

45,931,000

68,530,000

49

P ercen t Change

Retail Sales
A rea

Montana, total
Missoula trade area
Missoula County
City of Missoula
Trade area, except
city of Missoula

1954

1963

$ 778,033,000
81,884,000
48,752,000
43,190,000

$ 965,734,000
116,797,000
78,907,000
70,635,000

24
43
62
64

38,694,000

46,162,000

19

P ercen t Change

Sources: Population-—see footnote 8.
Personal income—■U. S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business
Economics, S u r v e y o f C u r r e n t B u s i n e s s , August 1964, and unpub
lished estim ates of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research.
Retail Sales—see Table 1.

income shifts within the trading area, obviously retailers in
Missoula benefited the most: between 1954 and 1963, sales in
the city increased 64 percent and sales in the rest of the trade
area were up only 19 percent. It is clear that here, as elsewhere
in the state, the larger trade center is gaining at the expense
of the smaller towns. Better highways, more automobiles, and
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higher incomes are making long-distance shopping trips rather
commonplace.
In 1954, combined retail sales in the seven-county Missoula
trade area amounted to almost $82 million. Fifty-three percent
of these sales ($43 million) were made by retailers in the city
of Missoula. By 1963, retail sales in the area were approaching
$117 million and 60 percent (almost $71 million) were made in
Missoula. In some kinds of businesses, almost all the 1963 sales
were made by firms located in Missoula—notably general merTABLE 6
RETAIL TRADE IN THE CITY OF MISSOULA, 1954 AND 1963
Item

Number of establishments
Number of proprietors
Total sales, current dollars
Total sales, 1954 dollars1
Average sales per establishment,
current dollars
Average sales per establishment,
1954 dollars1

Percent
Change

1954

1963

336

43,190,000
43,190,000

370
325
70,635,000
65,331,000

10
2
64
51

128,542

190,905

48

128,542

176,570

37

330

Adjusted for price changes since 1954 as measured by the consumer
price index for food and all other commodities.
Source: See Table 1.

chandise and department stores (79 percent), furniture, home
furnishings, and equipment stores (91 percent), and nonstore
retailers11 (93 percent). Between 1954 and 1963, the number of
retail establishments in the city of Missoula increased 10 per
cent; the number of proprietors decreased, but only 2 percent;
and employment increased, probably rather modestly. No good
source of employment data by counties is available. The Census
of Business employment figures, which show an increase of 48
percent in retail employment in Missoula, are for one week
only (the week ending nearest November 15); they are not
necessarily indicative of the year’s experience. Other sources
show very different results; for example, the Unemployment
Compensation Commission reports an increase of 6 percent in
annual average employment in Missoula County by wholesale
and retail trade establishments combined between fiscal 1955
and fiscal 1964.
Nonstore retailers include mail order houses, merchandise vending machine operators, and house-to-house selling organizations.
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The location of retail stores within the city also changed con
siderably between 1954 and 1963. Two new shopping centers—
Missoula’s first—were constructed on a main highway in the
rapidly growing southwest section of Missoula. Their total
floor space amounted to approximately 150,000 square feet.
Other smaller retail facilities were constructed along Highway
93 for a distance of approximately three-fourths mile. (In ad
dition, in November 1963 a third shopping center opened for
business on the eastern edge of Missoula; it is not included in
any of the data or discussions which follow.)
With the aid of the scale drawings which appear in Insurance
Maps of Missoula, Montana, published by the Sanborn Map
Company, the approximate area, in square feet, devoted to sev
eral different types of retail stores in Missoula in 1954 and 1962
was determined and the expansion noted. The kinds of busi
nesses compared were general merchandise (including variety)
stores; food stores; apparel and accessories stores; furniture,
home furnishings, and equipment stores; and drug stores. Clas
sifications used were the same as those in the Census of Busi
ness; they also appear in the Standard Industrial Classification
Manual, 1957, and the Supplement to 1957 Edition, published
in 1963. Estimates of square footage are rough; the figures were
taken directly from the blueprints with no investigation as to
what proportion was sales space and what was storage space.
When increases in square footage in the five kinds of busi
nesses listed above are compared to growth in personal income
and in retail sales, they appear to be generally reasonable
(Tables 5 and 7). Only drug stores show a growth in space
which seems out of line with other measures. Thus, the fear
of overbuilding of retail facilities in Missoula appears to have
been unjustified. Even with the addition in late 1963 of a third
shopping center, at the east entrance to the city, increases in
square footage seem generally reasonable.
However, the estimates of floor space in Table 7 conceal
some of the more interesting locational changes which occurred
between 1954 and 1962, and which are responsible for much of
the concern about Missoula’s downtown situation. Practically
all of the increase in facilities occurred along Highway 93,
either in the two shopping centers or in adjacent areas. While
these new outlets were being added, the space devoted to gen
eral merchandise and department stores, apparel, and drugs
in the downtown area remained about the same. Although the
furniture group shows a small over-all decline, the subcate-
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gory of radio, television, and music shops increased its square
footage; again, the growth occurred along the 93 Strip.
But it is in the food store group that the most pronounced
changes have taken place. Between 1954 and 1963, the number
of food stores declined 28 percent, from 49 to 35, while the
amount of floor space increased by one-third. All of the net in
crease can be accounted for in three large chain stores along
Highway 93. Space devoted to groceries in the downtown and
North Higgins areas declined sharply. Meanwhile, on a con
stant (1954) dollar basis, average sales per food store in the
city of Missoula were 136 percent higher in 1963 than in 1954.
This may be contrasted with the 37 percent increase in average
sales of all Missoula retail establishments and with the very
modest 7 percent increase in average sales per drug store.
It seems clear, then, that rather than overbuilding facilities
in Missoula, retailers in most cases simply have been adjusting
to different ways of doing business. This, of course, may not be
true in other cities in the state; among the larger Montana
towns Missoula has enjoyed an unusually favorable environ
ment for retail growth in recent years.
The changes this report has discussed always involve diffi
cult adjustment problems for some individuals and businesses;
this has been true in Missoula and in Montana’s other major
trade centers. In the smaller towns around the state, the grad
ual erosion of rural customers has created much more difficult
problems. The movement to the larger urban areas will con
tinue and the probability is that the number of small-town re
tailers will continue to decline—a fact which should be care
fully considered in planning and not allowed to be sentimen
talized out of awareness.
In the larger towns, there is little doubt that there are ad
vantages in large-scale retail enterprises, particularly in food
stores, but in other lines as well. The number of new small, in
dependent enterprises in Missoula since 1954, however, indi
cates that opportunities for the small Montana businessmen do
exist in retailing today. This may not be so in every kind of
business, nor in every community, but by carefully consider
ing both his choice of business and of community, as well as
realistically assessing his own personal qualifications—includ
ing aptitude, training, and capital—a prospective small retailer
may reasonably expect a successful venture in Montana.

